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BY EDWARD BRUCE HILL
RELIGIO. the word from which the modern word "rehgion"
comes, means, as is generally known, respect for the gods.
The religious man, in the classical sense, was he who showed thenl
respect and reverence.
The word has not greatly changed in passing over into modern
s|>eech, in meaning any more than in form. The religious man is
still he who respects and loves God, who seeks to please Him and
takes pleasure, or, at any rate is scrupulous, in His worship, avoids
impiety and profanity, is reverent, and observes carefully all such
rules and ceremonies as in whatever form he has adopted them,
show his submission to and sense of dependence on Him.
Owing to our changed conception of God. by which He has
l>ecome a morally and ethically good Being, we expect now other
things also from a religious man. We expect him to be ethically
good, because we consider the service of God to include this, and
we look to see in one who. ceremonially and by formal acts, shows
himself religious, conduct which ethically is such as we should
consider in accordance with morality, which we have come to con-
sider the will of God.
But this ethical conduct is still not a part of religion, or is so.
only in a secondary or derivative way. Religion, in itself, is con-
cerned only with pleasing God. He may be pleased by certain cere-
monial observances, he may be pleased by right conduct, but from
the standpoint of religion both things belong to the same class. With
right conduct, as right conduct, religion has nothing to do. It is
only when right conduct is considered as an obedience to God's
will and is an action taken with a view to pleasing Him. that it
comes within the scope of religion at all. Whenever gods have
been Cas has often been the case) without anv particular moral
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character, religion has not concerned itself with conduct in an ethi-
cal sense. That has been left in the domain of philosophy and
morals ; a domain, under such circumstances, wholly foreig^n to that
of religion.
Morality on the other hand has no natural relation to God. It
involves only the relation between men, and the right conduct of
men to each other. Acts in the highest degree reprehensible from
the religious point of view may be indifferent, or even laudable,
morally, while acts which violate every principle of morality ma\
be indifferent or even meritorious when viewed from the standpoint
of religion. Thus atheism or blasphemy, for example, are indiffer-
ent morally, though among the worst of religious offences, while
such acts as the massacres described in the Book of Joshua, while
horrifying to the moral sense are, religiously, highly laudable.
The essence of religion is to please God, whatever be the con-
duct which will have that result. The essence of morality is to act
ethically. If the two principles agree in prescribing or appro^nng
certain conduct, the agreement is purely fortuitous. Religion cares
nothing for the ethical character of the act, so long as it will be
pleasing to God ; morality cares nothing for the will of God with
respect to it. so long as it is ethically right.
Ethics or morality has always labored under one great difficulty,
the lack of a sanction. Admitting that certain conduct is morally
rigbt, and admitting, also, that certain other conduct is morally
wrong, still why should the former be followed and the latter
avoided? Many attempts have been made to answer this question
and all have failed. The most generally received answer at the
present time is that God commands ethical conduct and will punish
unethical conduct. That does, indeed, afford the needed sanction,
but it chanjj:es the nature of morality and makes it only a subdivision
of religion. We are to do right, not because it is right, but because
God commands it. Morally right conduct, then, is a phase of re-
spect for God, and stands with attendance at public worship. Sun-
day observance, or any other like formal acts.
Without any sanction and without any answer to the question
stated in the last paragraph, morality has more than held its own.
The sense of right and wrong, however arising, and upon whatever
it may be based, with or without religious belief and regardless
of the particular nature of that religious belief, where any is to
be found, has in general been men's guide and tends constantly to
become so to a greater degree. Imperfect ns it is. has been and
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inust be, it is nevertheless based upon a feeling- of obligation to the
rest of mankind, and of distinction between right and wrong con-
duct which there is a duty to observe. No doubt it is undergoing
constant modification as to its classification of certain conduct or
its judgtnent of certain acts. Dependent for its being upon enlight-
enment and social development, and var>'ing as these vary, it keeps
pace, for the mass of the community, with these, and represents at
any given time, inevitably, the state of general feeling.
This sense of right and w^rong is the most valuable social asset
of the community. It can be satisfied, in each individual, only by
conduct which is in accord with the standards of the time. It may
be said, in a sense, to need no sanction, for it imposes itself upon
the individual and its elevation and force increase with his enlight-
enment, l^'^ell-founded or not, subject to a theoretically adequate
sanction or not, it is powerful and effective and is the only efficient
means by v/hich social conditions are maintained in a tolerable state
or are improved. Upon it all teachers of higher morality must rest,
cmd by and through it alone can progress in the direction of a better
life be made. Without minute examinations as to its source or
validity, it must be taken into account as the one vital force upon
v.hich we can rely for the advancement of the race.
That we may utilize this force to the utmost w^e must strengthen
it as far as possible. We must make it felt by men's consciences
to the fullest extent. We must do all that in us lies to make it the
sole criterion of conduct, to enlighten it by the highest moral ideas.
and to set every possible obstacle in the way of those evasions of
the obligations which it imposes to which men are so prone. Its
power is already so great that few men nm openly counter to it. As
a rule men will not do what they acknowledge to themselves to
l>e wrong. They must find some way of justifying to themselves
their intentional act before they can do it. Enlightenment makes
the justification of a wrong act more difficult, but on the other hand
there is a more dangerous and more subtle influence which under-
mines the whole structure of the rule of conduct established by the
sense of right. This influence comes from religion.
As has been said before, religion, by setting up for morality a
sanction in the will of God. instead of strengthening it as might,
a priori, have been supposed, has changed its nature and reduced
its importance. Morally right conduct, since it has been based upon
the will of God, becomes important only as an act which will please
Him. While no doubt it is taken that God desires right conduct.
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yet if He could conceivably desire wrong conduct, then the obliga-
tion which exists to do right would become, with equal force, an
obligation to do wrong. That is. the quality of the act has ceased
to be important, but only the attitude of God toward it has impor-
tance.
So, too. the value and force of the sense of right and wrong
is thus destroyed, and morally right conduct falls into the same class
with acts morally indifferent, but which are supposed to please Gocl.
This is one of the most serious and harmful effects of the religious
view. What conduct is in accord with the moral standards of the
time is a matter comparatively easy of determination. Every man
carries in himself the touchstone of his action, nor is there usually
any considerable divergence of views upon this subject in the com-
munity. But what conduct will please God is a very different mat-
ter, and one far more difficult to decide. Without revelation it
would be impossible and with revelation the door is opened s<i
wide, the interpretations of texts and the claims of those who assert
their authority to speak in His name afiford so much room for dis-
pute and uncertainty, that no satisfactory conclusion acceptable to
all, or capable of anything resembling a demonstration, is possible.
When once the principle that God requires or is pleased with any
acts other than those which morality dictates has been admitted, all
standards of conduct are gone.
Tlie notion that God is pleased with or requires acts as to which
morality is silent, or wdiich it condemns, is of course far more
ancient than any association of morality with His will or service.
So long as early anthropomorphism lasted, and the gods were only
greater or more powerful lords or kings, capable of love or hate,
having likes and dislikes similar to those of men, exacting tribute,
obedience and respect exactly as the local earthly ruler did, no such
association was possible. Of course, as the king, in general, pun-
ished, and repressed crime, enforced order and protected ordinary
legal rights, God would probably do the same, but regard to all these
things were not matters of service to Him. By refraining from
crime, disorder and wronging others a man would escape punish-
ment, but would commend himself to God only negatively. To win
His favor, to be "a man after God's own heart" (in the phrase of
the Old Testament) he must be assiduous in His worship, lilx'ral
in his sacrifices, punctual in all of the ceremonial observances which
marked his respect and reverence for Him. To one who sedulously
did all this, much would be pardoned which otherwise would have
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brought punishment. Upon one who neglected any one of them, no
matter how moral his conduct, punishment was sure to fall,
A striking and familiar instance which illustrates this is to be
seen in the cases of David and Uzzah. The former's life was cer-
tainly marked by a course of conduct in which morality had no
part. There are few offences which he did not commit, but he was
devoted in his service of his God, and was beloved and blessed by
Him accordingly. Even when he had committed an offence so
great as to make some punishment unavoidable, Nathan announced
that punishment to be only that he would not be permitted to build
the temple for his God which he had intended. Uzzah committed
(and that quite unintentionally) an act which the same God con-
strued into one of disrespect. He was punished at once with death.
Of course, profane history is full of such instances, but no parallel
could illustrate better than that of David and Uzzah the wholly un-
important character attributed to moral conduct, and the vast im-
portance given to religious conduct in early times.
So long, however, as morality stood by itself, it could hold its
own. To be moral was never unpleasing to the gods (except in cer-
tain rare cases where they wanted a man to act wrongfully, to give
an excuse for punishing him) and so morality occupied a field by
itself where it developed fully under the care of philosophers and
moral teachers, who did not seek to meddle with religious affairs.
But when the time came when God was regarded as primarily
a moral being, when morally right conduct was supposed to be as
necessary, or almost as necessary to please Him as religious conduct,
and when the basis of morality was placed in the will of God, the
downfall of morality came. No longer something by itself, of eter-
nal and independent validity and obligation, but only a means of
pleasing God. like the offering of sacrifices, the building of a tem-
ple or a church or attendance at public worship, it became imcertain.
shifting, and of doubtful obligation.
.So long as it stood by itself the answer to the question why a
man should do or refrain from a given act was simple ; it was be-
cause he felt it to be right or wrong. When the answer was because
God willed it or forbade it. no man could decide for himself. It
might be morally right, but if God forbade it it must not be done :
it might be mlorally wrong, but if God commanded it it must be
done. Had not God commanded the sacrifice of Isaac, even though
he stayed it finally as a reward for Abraham's obedience? Had He
not accepte.j the sacrifice of Jepthah's daughter? Had He not com-
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manded the slaughter of the Canaanitcs, approved the murder of
Sisera, and in innumerable other cases commanded or blessed acts
revolting to the moral sense? It might be, in a given case, His
will that the prescriptions of morality should be disregarded and
until His will was known the conduct which the inner sense of right
and wrong most strongly approved might be precisely that which
must not be followed. If that will could be known it must be fol-
lowed, and however repugnant to man's natural sense of right and
wrong it might be. it was the infallible declaration of what he
must do.
Thus, in making morality spring from and be dependent upon
the will of God, any true criterion became impossible. There was
no longer any right or wrong. The will of God had swallowed
them up. (Ordinarily, no doubt, men might take their inner feeling
as itself an indication of God's will, but it was a feeble and faulty
indication, always subject to be over-ridden by a more authoritative
declaration. The conflict between religion and morality was thus
established.
For many centuries there was no doubt as to the victor in that
conflict. Religion won. Prophets, priests, and even at a later time,
ministers, drove unwilling sovereigns and people to acts repugnant
to every feeling of morality and humanity by proclaiming such acts
to be the will of God. Through all the long and dreadful series
of religious persecutions, from the slaughter of the priests of Baal
to the hanging of the Quakers in New England, the supposed will
(.f God overrode the moral law.
Pagan nations w-ere less subject to the evil. Their gods were
not necessarily perfect, nor did morality, in their view, depend
solely upon the will of the gods. The gods might force their will
on men, whether right or wrong, but they could not change the
quality of their acts, and men might sometimes be laudable for brav-
ing the anger of the gods rather than do wrong. For a Christian
such a thing was unthinkable. Right, in their view, was what God
commanded, wrong was what he forbade, and he who acted contrar\-
to God's will necessarily, by that fact, did wrong.
Indeed it has been, and even now is, common to hear morality
condemned by the clergy. Men who lead moral lives without hav-
ing any religious belief are denounced because a morality which has
not its source in 'i desire to obey God is considered of no value in
itself, and of a nature to lead men astray. No doubt this attitude
is due. in part, to the doctrine of justification by faith, which makes
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morally right conduct, in itself, unimportant. This attitude towards
morally right conduct is less prevalent than it was once. In the
eighteenth century the deists and sceptics were almost as much de-
nounced for their moral lives as for their doctrines. We have passed
that stage but, in some places the remains of the old attitude are
to be found.
In general, at the present day however, morality has regained
much of its ascendancy. The clergy are not now regarded as oracles
of God, and their utterances do not rank as revelations of His will.
While, theiefore, the old vicious theory still persists, it has lost in
this respect the power to do harm.
Only when some misled fanatic succeeds in persuading a rela-
tively small band of followers that God speak;-, through his mouth
do we see morality succumb to religion. Mankind in general, while
still considering right and wrong as consisting solely in obedience
or disobedience to the will of God, have come to regard their moral
sense as the only declaration of that will, and so to act. in general,
as if no such doctrine had been adopted.
We have therefore again reached a satisfactory condition, so
far as our moral judgments are concerned. We are not now in any
great danger of thinking conduct right which our moral sense tells
us to be wrong because we believe that we have some revelation of
God's will to the contrary. But while, on this part of the field,
morality has been victorious over religion, in another quarter the
case is not the same.
As has been said, the essence of morality is to do right, while
the essence of religion is to please God. If we have largely escaped
from the danger of thinking that morally wrong conduct can ever
please God. we have not escaped from the worse, because more prev-
alent and far-reaching evil, of thinking that God can be pleased by
other things as well. While morality has pretty well freed itself
from the deadly clutch in which religion held it. it must still face it
as an antagoni.st conducting the battle in another way.
Religion primarily consisted in worship, sacrifice, the paying of
honor to God by external acts, the p:.blic and private observance
oi the formal prescriptions of that particular form of faith which
the particular person professed. La this forjn it still persists, not
in its pristine vigor, not holding such a sway as once it did over so
large a portion of mankind, but nevertheless still of a verj^ consider-
able importance.
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That "no man liveth and sinneth not" is so obvious as to be
axiomatic, and hence he who would please God must frequently
fail. Accepting morality as the will of God, in the form in which
man's consciousness declares it, yet no one can perfectly comply
with that will by leading a morally perfect life. All must, to a
greater or less degree, fail to comply with the highest moral stand-
ards, and thus fail to comply fully with the will of God. If that
were all, man could only bend his efforts to approaching as near
as possible to that ideal moral perfection Avhich he cannot actually
attain. Only so could he hope effectually to please God. As his
whole fate and fortune in this world and the next depend upon his
pleasing God (leaving aside, for the present, the doctrine of justi-
Acation by faith) he would have the strongest possible incentive to
a right life. God may be expected to recognize that human weak-
ness cannot attain perfection, and to accept an earnest, sincere and
constant effort as the best offering which can be made. Were right
living the only way of pleasing God, this would be the strongest of
motives for right living, and the most powerful support of morality.
But unfortunately religion appears to destroy, in great measure,
all the beneficial effects of such a belief. Religion presents to man
another method of pleasing God, far easier and less repugnant to
his tendencies. It assures him that right living is only one of the
ways in which God may be pleased, and perhaps not the most eft'ec-
tual. Indeed, religion depends for its very existence upon the posi-
tion that right living, of itself, cannot suffice; that worship, the
observance of Sunday, taking part in organized religious obserA-
ances contributing to the support of organized religion, study of the
Bible, and the intellectual acceptance of a great number of state-
ments with reference to the nature of God. the origin, nature and
destiny of man. and a host of historical occurrences are the truly
vital things, without which mere morality is wholly unavailing. Even
when, as is sometimes the case, morality is given an equal place
with these other things, it is set no higher, and the utmost that
religion will concede is that all these things are equally important.
It could r.ot be otherwise. If morally right living were sufficient
in itself, it would not m.atter whether the reason for its sufficiency
were that this alone would please God, or something inherent in
morality itself. In either case religion would have no reason for
existing. Observances and acts of worship and homage which can-
not have an effect become unimportant. Whatever a man's purpose
or motive, if an earnest effort to lead a morally right life will suf-
RELIGION AND MORALITY 601
fice for his salvation, morality is all that he needs. This host of
morally indifferent acts and beliefs cannot aid him, nor matter to
him. These things, however, are of the very substance of religion,
and if they were surrendered, or their unimportance admitted, re-
ligion would have no reason to exist.
But the maintenance of the importance of these religious mat-
ters is harmful in the highest degree to morality. To lead a morally
right life is hard, however easy it may be to discuss what is neces-
sary to that end. It requires the subduing or restraining of natural
passions and tendencies, the surrender of desires, the curbing of
appetites, renunciation, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice. It is needless
to point out what self-subjugation and self-control demands. We
are all conscious of it.
To attend public worship, however, to join a church, to repeat a
creed, to pay out money for pew-rent or as a contribution, to accept
dogmas, to observe Sunday to comply with any and all ordinances
of religion, is easy. It requires little thought and little self-denial,
and it imposes no other burden than the performance of the physical
act.
When, therefore, religion offers these two ways of pleasing God.
and puts them on a par if it does not set a higher value upon the
morally indiff'ereni acts, it deals a deadly blow at morality. That
man should choose the more difficult of two courses equally open
to him would be impossible. It would not be even rational. When
he is told tl'at to follow the more difficult course will be of no avail
unless he aiso follows the other, there can be no question of what
he will do.
It is true that, with the return to morality which has been noted
above, it has also been put on a parity, generally speaking, with the
dogmas and observances of religion, but this point is largely illusory.
In some part of his duties a man must fail. He cannot wholly com-
ply with ihe will of God. But he can easily comply with those
things annoimced by his religion as God's will which have no moral
character, and the tendency is irresistible to make formal observ-
ances atone for moral delinquencies. It is and always has been a
refuge for anyone who is unwilling to comply with the moral law
that he can please God by these formal matters, and to make his
strictness in that respect offset his looseness in the other.
In fact, this result has followed, and it has often been a source
of regret to persons interested in the churches, as well as a ground
of criticism to those not so interested, that many persons who are
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strict in the observance of what are called, and properly called, their
"religious duties," live lives which by no means show a high regard
for morality, using the word in its broad sense. It has been a fre-
quent source of criticism also by Protestants of the Catholic Church,
that the lower classes in Catholic countries, while very devout, do
not show a high morality (and sometimes show hardly any at all)
in their lives. Accusations of hypocrisy, too, are often made against
men who, while religious, are in their daily life unscruplous if not
dishonest, and loose if not dissolute.
But the fact is that these criticisms and accusations are un-
founded, in the sense in which they are meant, as much as the
charges of "Formalism" lavished upon the Church of England in
the seventeenth century. Xo particular church is open to criticism
more than another. The evil is inherent. Once let a man think that
by any performance, no matter what, of any morally indifferent act,
no iTHatter what, he can please or propitiate God, or to any degree
whatever make up for moral delinquencies, and he will avail himself
of the opportunity. That is the fundamental principle upon which
all churches are agreed; that acts of piety or religion are pleasing
to God in the same way that a morally right life is pleasing, and
while they differ as to the particular acts which they consider pleas-
ing to God, those dift'erences are not essential. The only important
thing is that some such acts are meritorious in the sight of God.
Xor are those people hypocrites whose life is not ethical, but
who are strict in their religious observances. That a libertine should
be honest, or that a dishonest man should be continent, shows no
hypocrisy. As little does it show hypocrisy that an unscruplous
man should be religious, unless it is clear that he is so only for the
sake of deceiving the public. A man may be honestly pious, hon-
estly religious, whose life is far from what a high moral sense would
require. Jle may. and religion encourages him to do so, truly
believe that by his sincere devotion he is atoning for his moral lapses.
Indeed, it he accept the doctrine of justification by faith and reason
logically, he could reach no other conclusion than that questions of
morality were wholly unimportant, if only he accept sincerely that
Ix^lief. BuL without proceeding in so severely logical a way, there
is no reason why he should not, and in many cases he undoubtedly
does, believe that his strictness in religion makes up for his lack
of strictne.is in his moral duties.
Thus we see that religion is the foe of morality, and this hostility
is inevitable and irremediable. They are at war in their principles.
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Morality only seeks morally rig-ht conduct. Religion only seeks re-
spect, reverence, and obedience to God. While religion makes a
morally right life one form of obedience to God, it also defines and
enforces other forms, which it makes of equal, if not greater, impor-
tance. It offers him who finds obedience in one form too difificuh.
a choice of other w^ays, far easier and equally efficient. It con-
demns the good man who does not believe, quite as much as the bad
man who does sincerely believe and is faithful to his religious duties.
Therefore it depresses the value of morality and offers a more easilv
earned salvation. Morality can offer nothing to offset this. Salva-
tion is not her business, and of God she knows nothing. She only
knows that one thing is right and another is wrong, that the one
should be followed and the other shunned. Had she the field to
herself she would, no doubt, overcome the world ; but if she did,
religion must perish and, while losing ground, that religion cannot
yet accept.
So the contest must go on. Man wants an easier way than that
of right living, and does not easily give up religion which offers it.
but we must all hope for a time when he will rise above such things.
Religion weakens his moral fibre, but we have made progress since
the time of Louis XI, and it may be that to recognize the antagonism
will be an aid in escaping from its consequences.
